A jump shot by Towns cut the lead to six later in the third before Paul made a 3, stole the ball from Jones and hit another 3 seconds later to make it 70-58. There was also a great difference in the commanders: Jellicoe, with the main fleet of 24 dreadnought battleships and other fleet assets, was a fast-track but careful professional. It is a good book to lead into a discussion on what is the nature of the future war you intend to fight and what is the best form of a battle command to fight that war. It will be communists vs. It is hard to be anything than personally sympathetic to the courageous, modest and dutiful Jellicoe, but his failure to select and train good squadron commanders made him a poor leader. At times it was very technical and detailed, but overall it was a very good book.
With these points noted, your points are dismissed. When hundreds of warships belonging to the two most powerful fleets in the world clashed off the coast of Denmark in 1916, the encounter had the potential to reshape the political map forever. Many books have considered aspects of military leadership, but this is one of the very few to explore the culture of command and to address the practical implications. This revealed a tension within the Royal Navy between those who favoured ships' captains to exercise initiative, guided by the admiral's intent, and those who believed it better for the admiral to retain tight control of every ship's movements. A book that does not look new and has been read but is in excellent condition. All military history should be do One of the best accounts I have read that truly explains why the Battle of Jutland unfolded as it did. They must play by the rules in the future … haha.
Winner of the Longman's History Today Book of the Year Award and the inaugural Westminster Medal for Military Literature More than a century had gone by since the Battle of Trafalgar. You can do it while doing another thing at house or perhaps in your office. Equally, however, Jellicoe displayed enormous caution during the battle and insisted on following his previous plans, designed to eliminate uncertainty from any encounter with the Germans. It went beyond the usual analysis of the Battle of Jutland to examine the behaviours of British commanding officers. Andrew Gordon's extraordinary, gripping book brilliantly recreates the atmosphere of the British navy in the years leading up to Jutland and gives a superb account of the battle itself and its bitterly acrimonious aftermath. An absolutely excellent analysis of Jutland and why it turned out the way it did. It can be from the various other encounters and also tale from some individuals.
The sinking of the Italian cruisers in the night action seems like the Royal Navy proving to itself that it had learned to fight at night. Last Updated: 16 Febrary, 1998. If we listen to Dr. Foreword by Admiral Sir John Woodward. Much as I would like to see Trump prevail, it might be best in the long run if he were slapped down. We've got 12 games to do it. I bought anything and everything on the battle and even consulted memoirs and other public papers.
The post-Jutland analysis and Beatty-Jellicoe confrontation then become the focus of scrutiny from which we can deduce our own conclusions. Admiral Tryon may have given the order which set the two battleships on their course towards certain disaster, but the extraordinary way in which his second-in-command and his captains stood idle while these events unfolded, shows how much the Royal Navy had lost its touch in its long period of supremacy after Trafalgar. Once the emergency is declared, the president simply needs to renew the declaration once a year to maintain a state of emergency. This part of the book felt rather over-extended, with very detailed accounts of the career of Evan-Thomas and the naval training of the future George V. The Navy showed an inability to integrate command and control tools, such as the wireless, and to develop a methodology to facilitate initiative and quick decision making processes through realistic training exercises. Army colonel who consults and writes about issues of national defense, with especial interest in the age of sail. As Gordon shows, the 1916 fighting technique can be laid back to a disaster during peace time maneuvers in 1893 23 years earlier.
Some of the similarities were quite interesting. No encounter is left un-discussed, no surviving statement left without reappraisal. Andrew Gordon is a Reader in the Defence Studies Department at King's College London, where he is the Maritime Historian. Beattie was over reckless and Jellicoe over cautious. Hopefully, this precedent will be used against all future presidents who use spurious claims of national emergencies to expand their powers and shrink our liberties. A remarkable saga of genius, tragedy, and passive corruption emerges. Comments on this post are now closed.
The role of initiative one hundred years earlier the author argues was allowed to atrophy over a long period of relatively unchallenged peace and technological advances. As each flag was hoisted clear of the deck… the yeoman spotted what it was and shouted it down to the signalmen on the bridge. Oh, what can I say - this book turns upside down all other histories of Jutland with a reasoned analysis of why the British Navy fought as it did on that day in 1916. Find sources: — · · · · June 2018 Gilbert Andrew Hugh Gordon born 23 July 1951 is a British. Generation after generation of British naval captains had been dreaming ever since of a 'new' Trafalgar - a cataclysmic encounter which would decisively change a war's outcome. Saying that, it must be remembered that after the battle the British fleet were ready for action again within days and the German fleet were terrified to come out and play again. At times it was very technical and detailed, but overall it was a very good book.
Although the British fleet was victorious over the Germans, the cost in ships and men was high, and debates have raged within British naval circles ever since about why the Royal Navy was unable to take advantage of the situation. Without the test of combat, other factors such as ship-handling, social connections and the appearance of warships often determined promotions to command rank. The essence of Gordon's argument is that the Navy placed great value on postings on the royal yachts and as signals officers to admirals, postings that were openly reserved for the sons of admirals and favourites of the Royal Family and which gave enormous advantage for future promotion. Because explicit international censure is what creates precedents in international law. The author really writes with great knowledge and familiarity for the periods and the players, a pleasure to read.